UGANDA: NORTHERN UGANDA’S POST CONFLICT CONDITION, PROF. KOMAKECH DANIEL

This State of Northern Uganda, critically examines the trajectory of post-conflict reconstruction in Northern Uganda through the framework of transitionally, challenging the conventional assumption that societies move linearly from Conflict → Recovery → Development. Drawing on evidence from major recovery interventions, including the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP I–III) and the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF I–III), the study argues that many communities experienced a cyclical pattern better characterised as Conflict → Recovery → Recovery → Recovery.   Rather than serving as a temporary bridge to sustainable development, recovery became a prolonged and self-reproducing condition marked by repeated rehabilitation programmes, aid-funded projects, and short-term livelihood support. While these interventions generated important gains in infrastructure, social services, and household welfare, they often failed to address deeper structural constraints related to economic transformation. Consequently, Northern Uganda entered what may be described as a “permanent recovery syndrome”, where recovery ceased to be a transitional phase and instead became permanently re-produced. This State of Northern Uganda argues for a shift from Recovery to sustainable Transformation genuine developmental transition.

GULU CITY-WEDNESDAY JULY 8,2026

By Okumu Livingstone Langol, (Uganda Correspondent)

The research was carried out by Prof. Daniel Komakech Director of Gulu University Research Directory

The verbatim account

Historical Foundations of NUSAF and PRDP part III edition

And administrative infrastructure, signified the re-emergence of state presence in previously war-affected spaces. This phase reflected what transitional governance literature describes as “post-conflict re-territorialisation,” (drawing on political geography and state spatial theory; Lefebvre, 1974(1991); Mann, 1988,1993; Brenner,1999. This is where the state seeks to reassert spatial authority through visible infrastructure and administrative penetration.

PRDP II (2011–2015) became more explicitly tied to service delivery restoration and system strengthening, particularly in education, health, water, and local government administration. Here, the dividend shifted from mere reconstruction to functional restoration. This means that the infrastructure was increasingly expected to translate into operational public services. Yet, evaluations of this phase indicate persistent gaps between infrastructure completion and service functionality, reflecting a recurring transitional dilemma: buildings were restored faster than systems could be operationalised, leaving a partial and uneven recovery landscape (Government of Uganda, 2012).

PRDP III (2015–2019/20), the framing of recovery had largely transitioned into development consolidation and resilience mainstreaming, aligning PRDP more closely with national development planning frameworks (including NDP II-III). The early recovery dividend in this phase was therefore less visible in physical reconstruction terms and more evident in institutional normalisation, 11

decentralised service delivery strengthening, and integration of Northern Uganda into national development trajectories.

From a transitionality perspective, PRDP I–III collectively illustrate a layered and evolving conception of the early recovery dividend:

1. PRDP I: dividend of visibility (state return through infrastructure)
2. PRDP II: dividend of functionality (restoration of services)
3. PRDP III: dividend of normalisation (integration into national development systems)

Yet, across all three phases, a persistent tension remains between infrastructure-heavy recovery and institutionally uneven development, suggesting that while PRDP successfully accelerated physical reconstruction and state re-entry, its ability to fully transform recovery gains into sustained developmental equilibrium was uneven and contingent on deeper governance and political economy conditions (Government of Uganda, 2007; 2012; 2015).

Whereas the achievements were significant, beyond transitionality of restoring what existed before conflict to a transformational point, NUSAF and PRDP interventions simply cycled around restoration rather than transformation. The result is that Northern Uganda recovered basic functionality without fundamentally changing its precarious position within Uganda’s national political economy.

The biggest problem has been however, the problem of projectization of recovery. Both NUSAF and PRDP operated primarily through discrete projects;

1. Community infrastructure;
2. Livelihood grants;
3. Public works;
4. Capacity-building activities;
5. Local government support.

While these projects generated localized benefits, they rarely produced systemic economic change. Instead of focusing on 12

production systems, markets, institutions, property relations, mind-sets and labour systems, many interventions remained fragmented and short-term. Consequently, communities often became accustomed to accessing projects but not necessarily at building sustainable economic systems beyond project cycles.

This created a persistence of livelihood trap. NUSAF III, for example, represents perhaps the clearest example of this problem. Whereas its emphasis on resilience and income support undoubtedly helped vulnerable households survive shocks and improve welfare outcomes, however, resilience is not the same as transformation. Transitionality scholars argue that resilience programmes often stabilize poverty rather than eliminate it. For example, households become better able to cope with vulnerability without escaping vulnerability altogether.

Similarly, many beneficiaries improved their immediate welfare but remained outside of; industrial employment systems, formal value chains, export markets and advanced productive sectors.

But also, State reconstruction happened largely without economic transformation. It should be recalled that PRDP’s first objective was the consolidation of state authority. This objective reflected a broader post-conflict state-building agenda emphasizing government presence, administrative capacity, and service delivery. From a transitionality perspective, however, state reconstruction did not automatically produce economic transformation. Whereas Northern Uganda witnessed; expansion of district administrations, increased public infrastructure and greater government visibility, these achievements were not accompanied by equivalent industrialization, large-scale investment, or export diversification.

The region remained heavily dependent on subsistence agriculture and financed activities. Meaning, State-building outpaced economic restructuring. 13

Perhaps the most profound limitation of NUSAF and PRDP has been their inability to address the historical political economy that produced the marginalization of Northern Uganda. The region’s challenges did not begin with the LRA conflict. Instead, they are rooted in;

1. Colonial labour policies;
2. Uneven regional development;
3. Historical militarization;
4. Infrastructure deficits;
5. Limited industrial investment.

Consequently, conflict only intensified these problems but did not create them. Yet both NUSAF and PRDP were largely designed as post-conflict interventions rather than structural regional development programs. As a result, they addressed the consequences of marginalization more effectively than its causes.

The ultimate critique emerging from transitionality theory is that NUSAF and PRDP inadvertently institutionalized recovery itself. The idea of the production of permanent recovery, instead of creating a clear pathway from;